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We defend a methodology of discounting, for the eva-
luation of the long-term effects of climate policies, 
which relies on a social welfare objective, against the 
view that the market rate of return should be used for 
that purpose. We also show that in the long run, the 
discount rate for such policies should focus on the 
worst-case scenario for the most disadvantaged popula-
tions. As a consequence, it is likely that the appropriate 
discount rate for climate policies should be negative, 
implying a high priority for the future.
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Abstract
We defend a methodology of discounting, for the evaluation of the long-term effects of climate policies, 
which relies on a social welfare objective, against the view that the market rate of return should be used 
for that purpose. We also show that in the long run, the discount rate for such policies should focus on 
the worst-case scenario for the most disadvantaged populations. As a consequence, it is likely that the 
appropriate discount rate for climate policies should be negative, implying a high priority for the future.
Keywords
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Un taux d’escompte négatif pour les politiques climatiques
Résumé
Nous défendons une méthodologie de l’actualisation, pour l’évaluation des effets à long terme des poli-
tiques climatiques, qui repose sur un objectif de bien-être social, contre l’idée que le taux de rendement 
du marché doit être utilisé à cette fin. Nous montrons aussi que dans le long terme, le taux d’actualisation 
pour de telles politiques devrait se concentrer sur le scénario le plus défavorable pour les populations les 
plus défavorisées. En conséquence, il est probable que le taux d’actualisation approprié pour les politiques 
climatiques doive être négatif, ce qui implique une grande priorité pour le futur.
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Since the Stern Review (Stern 2007) and the debate it has sparked off, the dis-count rate has been at the center of hea-ted discussions about climate policies. 
In the very long run, the discount rate makes a 
huge difference in the evaluation of policies. The 
following table (Table 1) shows the minimum 
return that a $1 investment for the future should 
have to be considered better than consuming it 
now, depending on the discount rate that is adop-
ted and depending on the horizon. The 1.4% dis-
count rate is advocated by the Stern Review, but 
later Stern suggested that 2.7% might be a better 
figure. The table shows that this hesitation is not 
innocuous. Obviously, adopting a much higher 
discount rate as recommended by Nordhaus 
(2007) –around 5.5% – has even more extreme 
consequences.
Table 1: The implications of different 
discount rates
Horizon 1.4% 2.7% Ratio
50 2.00 3.79 1.89
100 4.02 14.36 3.57
200 16.13 206.11 12.78
500 1,044 609,848 584
1000 1,091,327 371,914,916,666 340,791
Legend: With a 1.40% discount rate, a $1 invest-
ment today must yield at least $4.02 in 100 years; 
with a 2.70% discount rate, the number jumps 
to $14.36, which is 3.57 greater.
The thesis defended in this paper is that climate 
policies may justify the use of a negative discount 
rate for their evaluation. There are two impor-
tant steps in the argument, each of which is an 
interesting separate thesis: 1) Different policies 
should be evaluated with different discount rates 
depending on what populations are impacted; 2) 
In the long run only the worst scenario for the 
worst-off fraction of the population counts.
Our thesis is at odds with the conclusion of Chap-
ter 7 in Posner and Weisbach (2010 –hereafter 
PW), even though we share the same premises: 
impartiality between generations, compatibi-
lity with ethical principles, and taking opportu-
nity costs into account. They advocate using the 
market interest rate as the discount rate for the 
selection of particular projects. It is an interesting 
question to understand how our similar premises 
can deliver very different practical conclusions. 
The main difference is that we disagree on how to 
make use of the discount rate. For us, it is a tool to 
assess and compare different consumption paths 
or money flows in terms of net present value; for 
PW, it serves to take into account the opportunity 
cost of the investment.
Our thesis is somewhat closer to Weitzman’s and 
Gollier’s arguments in favor of using a small, pos-
sibly a negative discount rate (Weitzman 1998, 
Gollier 2002), but involves different reasons. The 
paper is structured as follows. In the next section 
we briefly review the arguments of the advocates 
of the descriptive and the prescriptive approaches, 
in the debate about discounting (the “ethicists” 
and the “positivists”, as called by PW), and discuss 
agreements and disagreements with PW. Then in 
the next two sections we explain the methodo-
logy of computation of the discount and propose 
a reformulation of the Weitzman-Gollier set of 
arguments to the context of risk. The following 
section explains our core arguments. For the sake 
of an easy presentation, the bulk of the paper is 
formulated in the context of utilitarian reasoning, 
but we explain in the penultimate section why the 
utilitarian approach must be replaced with a more 
promising approach and how this can affect the 
discount rate. The final section concludes.
The descriptive-
prescriptive debate
The opposition between a descriptive approach 
and the prescriptive approach is hard to unders-
tand when it is labeled in this way, as suggested 
by Arrow et al. (1996). It is equally puzzling 
when the “ethicists”-“positivists” labels are used. 
As PW write, “in the end, of course, the positi-
vists’ approach is worth nothing unless it can be 
defended on ethical grounds.” (p. 150) So, the 
debate is not between ethics and something else, 
it is a debate within ethics.
The descriptive approach invokes two ethical 
arguments. The first is that market rates reflect the 
preferences of the population, so that it is unde-
mocratic to propose using different rates (Nord-
haus 2007). The climate economists who propose 
using lower rates for climate policies are impo-
sing their views on a population that appears to 
care less about the future than they do. (Gollier, 
in this issue, actually shows that risk-free market 
rates are lower than what ethicists propose!) This 
first argument is unacceptable but the reasons 
why it cannot be accepted are far from simple.
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There are several mistakes in the argument. The 
first is to seek to impose the population prefe-
rences on every evaluator. Obviously, there are 
many views in the population. If an evaluator 
wants to examine a development path with a 
great concern for the future, there must be some 
people in the population who share this concern. 
Even if nobody shared this concern, the evalua-
tor might be right against everyone else. Just as 
there is freedom of thought, just as different poli-
tical parties can have their own platforms, there 
should be a space for economic evaluation that 
embodies various views about social welfare and 
the principles of intergenerational equity.
The reply to this objection will certainly be: Any 
evaluation is admissible, but the government, in 
its decisions, cannot impose idiosyncratic views 
on the whole population. This is a powerful argu-
ment, even though history contains praisewor-
thy examples of governments imposing policies 
against the majority opinion (e.g., the abolition 
of death penalty in France in 1981). But this 
powerful democratic argument does not imply 
that the market interest rate should serve as the 
discount rate. It only requires a democratic debate 
to take place. This debate will have to ponder the 
various arguments underlying the computation of 
the discount rate. One cannot pretend to know 
the conclusions of this debate in order to pre-
vent some propositions from reaching the debate. 
Democratic principles cannot be used to bar 
some (minimally sound) ethical principles from 
the forum.
One could still try to argue that the market does 
tell us something about the population prefe-
rences over intertemporal trade-offs. The market 
interest rates are determined by the joint effect of 
technical possibilities (the productivity of capital) 
and the willingness of investors to transfer wealth 
into the future, with a benefit. Just like the relative 
market price of oranges and pears implies that all 
buyers active on both markets are willing to trade 
oranges for pears at this relative price, the interest 
rate indicates the investors’ and savers’ common 
marginal rate of substitution across time. This is 
true but investors and savers make decisions to 
transfer wealth for themselves by a few years. If 
they were asked to transfer wealth to other people 
living all over the world in many decades, they 
might express very different preferences. The 
financial markets don’t ask them this outlandish 
question, and therefore we cannot pretend to 
use their answer to a different question for this 
purpose. Observe, moreover, that the market 
interest rate also depends on the distribution of 
wealth in the population, which has no reason to 
be particularly democratic.
Even if there were markets in which people could 
express such preferences (private donations to 
environmental NGOs focused on the climate 
might be the relevant source of information), it 
is doubtful that such preferences would be more 
respectable than the outcome of an outright 
democratic debate involving the relevant exper-
tise and considering the best ethical arguments.
In conclusion, if experts like Stern propose a series 
of reasonable arguments leading to the conclusion 
that climate policies should be evaluated with a 
discount rate that is much lower than the market 
interest rate, they cannot be dismissed as unde-
mocratic and off track. They should be admitted 
to the democratic debate and their arguments 
should be carefully listened to (without guarantee 
that they will be adopted).
The second argument used by the advocates of 
the market rate is that this rate measures the 
opportunity cost of resources. This is the main 
argument considered, and endorsed, in PW. It 
is this argument that leads PW to propose using 
the market interest rate. This argument is crys-
tal clear. Suppose a climate policy costs $1 today 
and brings benefits worth $14.40 in one hundred 
years. According to Table 1, this policy is better 
than the consumption of the $1 today if the dis-
count rate is 2.7% or lower. The objection is that 
investing the same amount at the market rate, 
which is supposedly greater, would bring greater 
benefits to the future. Using a lower discount rate 
than the market is therefore branded as a recipe 
for choosing dominated policies which either 
cost more today or pay less tomorrow, or both.
This argument is very simple and extremely 
powerful. But it aims at the wrong target. More 
precisely, it relies in our view on a misunderstan-
ding of the role of the discount rate. The purpose 
of the discount rate is to make consumption 
levels or monetary values comparable across time. 
It makes it possible to compute the net present 
value (NPV) of any change to the status quo. If 
the NPV is positive, the change is an improve-
ment. But this does not mean that this particu-
lar change is optimal. In order to choose the best 
policy or project, one must compare the NPV 
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(computed with whatever discount rate seems 
appropriate) of all options, including ordinary 
market investments. Clearly, with this methodo-
logy, if one option costs less today or pays more 
tomorrow (or both) than another option, it will 
be deemed preferable, whatever the discount rate!
There is therefore no danger that adopting a 
lower discount rate than the market rate may 
induce inefficient (i.e., dominated at each period) 
choices. It will only imply making different 
choices among the efficient (i.e., undominated) 
options. With a lower discount rate, one will 
choose to invest more for the future, but one 
will never be tempted to invest at a low rate of 
return when a high rate of return is possible. If a 
business-as-usual investment policy that puts all 
savings in the financial market brings more bene-
fits to the future generations than a mitigation 
policy aimed at curbing GHG emissions, even 
the most devoted disciple of the Stern Review 
will approve it.
To illustrate this point, Table 2 presents an 
example of four policies, with their undiscounted 
benefits and their NPV according to two diffe-
rent values of the discount rate (1.4% is from the 
Stern Review, 5.5% has been advocated by Nord-
haus). Policies A and C are market investments 
at 5.5%, policy B is a climate policy with impacts 
equivalent to a 10% monetary return, policy D 
is a climate policy with impacts equivalent to a 
6% return. Policies A and B yield returns in 100 
years, while policies C and D pay in 500 years. 
The 5.5% discount rate enables us to check that 
climate policies B and D are not dominated by 
market investments, but is it helpful to choose 
between B and D? It suggests that B, which has 
impacts of greater value in the shorter term, is 
preferable to D. But a lower discount rate at 1.4% 
suggests otherwise, while still revealing that these 
climate policies are not dominated by the market. 
It is therefore important to have a good discount 
rate, not to check if the market dominates a cli-
mate policy –because any discount rate will do 
for that limited exercise, but to be able to choose 
between undominated policies. 
In conclusion to this point, when PW write: 
“even if the ethicists’ arguments are entirely cor-
rect, we must still carefully consider the oppor-
tunity cost of projects and pick those with the 
highest returns,” we fully agree, and every reaso-
nable “ethicist” should agree, too. But this does 
not imply that the market rate of return should 
be used for the evaluation of projects.
Note that the use of discount rates would be 
superfluous if the problem were to choose 
between policies with similar time profiles like 
policies A and B in Table 2, because their own 
rates of return can be directly compared. It is only 
when there are time trade-offs that computing 
the NPV becomes useful, as in the comparison 
between policies B and D. (Actually, as we will 
show later, projects with the same time profile 
may affect different populations, thus deserving 
different discount rates, which is equivalent to 
incorporating social benefits in the computation 
of their rate of return.)
There is another related methodological issue 
on which we disagree with PW. They propose to 
use the discount rate in a limited way: “Discoun-
ting… should be seen only as a method of choo-
sing projects, not as a method of determining our 
obligations to the future.” (p. 168) This separation 
Horizon A B C D
0 -1 -1 -1 -1
100 211 13781 0 0
500 0 0 4,23E+11 4,50E+12
Present value
1,40% 51,66 3430,41 4,05E+08 4,30E+09
5,50% 0,00 64,17 0,00 9,63
Table 2: How to choose policies with various discount rates
Legend: Policy A costs $1 today and pays $211 in 100 years; at a 1.4% discount rate, the present value is $51.66; 
at a 5.5% discount rate, it is $0.
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is a direct consequence of the tension produced 
by their idea that one should use the market dis-
count rate for the choice of projects, but never-
theless follow the ethicists to decide how much to 
save for the benefit of the future generations. In 
other words, two discount rates would be used in 
the methodology proposed by PW, although they 
do not make it fully explicit (and would perhaps 
allow for other considerations than standard wel-
farism to determine how much should be saved). 
The low discount rate of the ethicists would serve 
to check if more should be invested, whereas the 
choice of particular projects would use the mar-
ket rate in order to make sure to pick efficient 
options.
There is no need for such a dichotomous metho-
dology. The “ethically right” discount rate can 
be used both for the selection of projects and 
for deciding when to stop saving for the future, 
which constitute in fact one and the same set of 
decisions –selecting the projects includes choo-
sing the amount that is invested. One will start 
with the highest-NPV investment plans (which 
are those with the highest rate of return for their 
particular time profile) and go on as long as the 
NPV of the remaining projects is positive. Note 
that the discount rate itself goes up in the process, 
because as more is invested for the future, the 
future generations grow better off, which tends 
to raise the discount rate (see below for an expla-
nation of this phenomenon). Therefore a low dis-
count rate advocated now, on the background of 
a business-as-usual scenario in which the future 
generations are in jeopardy, need not be the indi-
cation of the market rate that will prevail after 
the recommended investment has been done. 
The convergence value of the market rate will be 
somewhere between the initial market rate and 
the initial discount rate.
Finally, let us briefly consider another objection 
raised by PW against the ethicists. They claim 
that choosing projects as the ethicists propose 
may be futile when private decisions to dissave 
may partly undo the public investments. Again, 
the ethicists can only agree and proclaim their 
innocence. Their criteria are meant to bear on 
final consequences, not on mistaken estimates 
of the consequences. If a certain Ricardian equi-
valence implies that the government cannot 
influence the macroeconomic savings rate, there 
is no point for the government to try to change 
it and no point in applying any discount rate to 
this kind of decision. If, in a less extreme case, 
public savings partly crowd out private savings, 
this must be taken into account, too.
In this section we have defended the ethicists and 
their prescriptive approach against the attacks of 
the positivists with their descriptive approach, 
but we haven’t said a word, almost, about what 
the prescriptive approach says and how it com-
putes its discount rate. To this we now turn.
The methodology of discounting
As announced in the introduction, for simplic-
ity we will provisionally adopt the utilitarian way 
of defining social welfare, and more precisely 
assume that social welfare can be computed as 
the sum of , where  is the consumption 
level of individual . What is important about 
this approach is that the function  is assumed 
to be the same for all individuals, which means 
in particular that there is no preference for ear-
lier generations against future generations, and 
we consider that this function embodies the 
preferences of the evaluator about inequalities 
in consumption –which means that, in terms of 
consumption, the approach is prioritarian rather 
than utilitarian. We will even adopt an assump-
tion that is common in the economic literature, 
and gives a special form to the utility function: 
,
where  can be interpreted as a coefficient of 
aversion for consumption inequality, and  is the 
minimum level of consumption that is required 
to make utility positive. With this function, the 
marginal utility is equal to , which makes 
things quite simple.
For the sake of simplicity we ignore the risk that 
future generations will not exist. This issue will be 
introduced later in the paper.
Suppose that   is reduced by a small amount 
 and , which occurs  periods later, is 
increased by a small amount . Is this good for 
social welfare? If the changes are infinitesimal, 
one can use the marginal utilities to evaluate the 
changes, and the variation in social welfare is then 
equal to
This can be expressed in present value by dividing 
every term by the marginal utility of , 
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and by comparing this expression with the dis-
counted sum , one obtains the 
discount rate by the formula
The discount rate is a direct expression of the 
relative priority of the two individuals (or genera-
tions), modulated by the time distance between 
the two individuals. If the future individual is 
better off than the present individual, the expres-
sion is greater than one, i.e., the discount rate is 
positive.
This methodology gives the discount rate that can 
serve to evaluate small projects. Any project that 
yields a rate of return greater than the discount 
rate is beneficial to social welfare. For big projects, 
the marginal utilities are no longer acceptable in 
the computation and one has to make a direct 
evaluation of the change in social welfare.
When the marginal utility is equal to  the 
formula for the discount rate simplifies into 
where  is the annual growth 
rate of  consumption between  and . When 
 is small, this formula can be approximated by 
the famous Ramsey formula .
A reasonable value for inequality aversion is 
 (the Stern Review took ) while a 
standard estimate for the growth rate is 1.3 (as 
in the Stern Review), which implies a discount 
rate of approximately 2.6% (Stern adds a 0.1% 
term due to the risk of extinction of humanity, we 
ignore this term for the moment). This discount 
rate may be much lower than the market rate 
of return, but, as explained in the previous sec-
tion, this is not particularly threatening for this 
methodology and there is no danger of choosing 
dominated investment plans.
Discounting under risk
Weitzman (1998) has proposed an interesting 
argument in favor of adopting even lower dis-
count rates for investments that pay in the very 
long run, when there is a background risk on the 
growth rate. We first present a variant of it which 
enables us to connect the argument to Ramsey’s 
formula, in a similar fashion as in Gollier (2002). 
Suppose that there is uncertainty about future 
consumption, and that our criterion is the expec-
ted value of social welfare (which is also, in the 
case of utilitarianism, the sum of expected utili-
ties). Let us again consider two small changes  
and . Unlike the level of consumption, these 
changes are certain. The change in social welfare 
is now equal to
where  denotes the expected value, and the for-
mula for the discount rate becomes:
(  now denotes the discount rate, and we keep 
the notation  for the discount rate in a parti-
cular state of nature.) What Weitzman noticed 
is that this kind of formula involves neither the 
expected value of  nor the expected value 
of  but the expected value of  
More precisely, recalling from the previous sec-
tion that in every particular state of the world, 
, one has
Now, what is remarkable about this expression is 
that it has the form of a well-known quasi-arith-
metic mean of the form  which is 
known to converge to the minimum value of  
when  tends to infinity. Therefore, in the very 
long run, the discount rate under risk converges 
to the lowest possible value of the risk-free dis-
count rate. This is a remarkable result. For long 
term evaluations, one can focus on the worst sce-
narios in which future consumption is the lowest 
and the corresponding discount rate is the lowest.
PW propose an intuitive explanation of this rea-
soning directly based on Weitzman’s original for-
mulation.  For every possible value of  there is a 
corresponding discount rate  (which Weitzman 
and PW assimilate to the market rate, rather than 
the Ramsey rate, in the corresponding scenario). 
The expected present value of the investment, 
when all possible discount rates are considered, 
is then equal to
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and by comparing this expression to 
, one directly obtains the desi-
red formula.
This explanation remains, however, a little mys-
terious because it is not obvious why one should 
compute the expected present value of a project 
rather than some other formula. In fact, in gene-
ral the expected present value is not correct. What 
should be computed, in the Ramsey approach, is 
the ratio of the expected values of the marginal 
utilities, 
but when there is no risk about the present 
consumption the expected value of the mar-
ginal social value of  is just the sure value 
 and therefore the ratio of 
expected values is, in this specific case, the expec-
ted value of the ratio. 
To illustrate the result, consider the situation in 
which with 80% chance, the growth rate will be 
1.3% on average in the future, but there is 20% 
chance that it will be zero. Let us retain  so 
that the risk-free discount rate is either 2.6% or 
0%. This example shows that the convergence to 
the lowest value may be rather slow, but also that 
the discount rate is very quickly well below the 
average discount rate 0.8x2.6 = 2.08%.
Table 3: Discount rate for different 
horizons when the growth rate is 
either 1.3% or 0%
Admittedly, risk typically affects not just the 
background growth rate of consumption but 
also the future yield of the investment. Taking 
account of this risk further complicates the dis-
count rate, and it is easy to show that the discount 
rate applied to expected benefits should be lower 
for projects with greater returns in states in which 
the marginal social utility of the beneficiaries is 
greater. 
For our discussion of climate policy, it is espe-
cially relevant to see if the Weitzman convergence 
to the lowest discount rate remains valid in this 
context. If risk takes the form of an uncertain 
rate of return on the investment, then, keeping 
the possible rates of return in the various states of 
nature fixed and varying the horizon, one obtains 
an interesting generalization of Weitzman’s result: 
In the long run the discount rate that should be 
applied to the expected return of the investment 
tends to
 
where  and  are, respectively, the discount rate 
and the rate of return in the various possible states 
of the world. When  is not a random term, this 
expression singles out the lowest discount rate, as 
was explained previously. But when  is random, 
other possibilities appear.
Let us first explain how to derive this result. If 
one invests $1 in a project that has a random rate 
of return  in  periods, the marginal effect on 
expected social welfare is equal to
 
In present value, this reads
 
Now, suppose one wants to equate this to a NPV 
with a discount rate applied to expected returns:
From this equation one immediately derives
At the numerator as well as at the denominator, 
the greatest term dominates when  goes to infin-
ity, which implies the generalized formula.
This generalized formula is particularly interes-
ting when it is used to compare different kinds of 
investments. An investment that is most profitable 
in good times (such as, typically, a market invest-
ment) may have a low  ratio in 
relatively good times in which  is high, or in bad 
times in which  is low. In both cases, the appro-
priate discount rate is greater than the lowest . 
In contrast, an investment that is most profitable 
Horizon Discount rate
50 1,74%
100 1,35%
200 0,80%
500 0,32%
1000 0,16%
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in bad times (such as a climate policy that averts 
dangerous climate change) will definitely have to 
be evaluated with the lowest  because its greatest 
rate of return will happen in the states with the 
lowest discount rate. In conclusion, Weitzman’s 
argument may have to be watered down when 
applied to ordinary investments with returns that 
are correlated with growth, but seems to retain its 
full force for projects that are aimed at protecting 
us against climate hazards.
Weitzman (2009) proposed an even more striking 
(“dismal”) thesis by arguing that the discount rate 
can be made arbitrarily close to -100% even in 
the short run. But this argument is much less 
convincing and a discussion of it can be found in 
Fleurbaey and Zuber (2012).
Priority for the poor in the 
long run
We do agree with Weitzman, however, that a 
negative discount rate may be justified for cli-
mate policies. There is another line of argument 
that, combined with the phenomenon, described 
in the previous section, of convergence toward to 
the lowest rate in the long run, reinforces the pre-
sumption that negative values are relevant. 
The debate about “the” discount rate is somewhat 
misleading because there is not a single dis-
count rate but as many discount rates as there are 
distributions of costs and benefits among 
different populations. We have already seen this 
phenomenon when the discount rate to be used 
depends on the time lag between generations, as 
in Table 3.
More generally, the formula that determines the 
discount rate is about changes in the consump-
tion of two individuals  The value of the dis-
count rate depends on the consumption levels 
of these two individuals. Imagine now that two 
individuals  from a future generation, not just 
one individual, will benefit from a change in their 
consumption, so that we have to deal with the 
formula
As before, one can compute the present value by 
dividing by the marginal utility of , and com-
pare this with a formula involving person-to-per-
son discount rates:
Now this formula is structurally similar to the 
formula obtained in the case of risk. Imagine 
that  and  share the benefit of the investment 
in fixed proportions:  and  
The above expression can then be written as
for
The same argument as in the previous section 
implies that in the very long run, i.e., when  
tends to infinity,  will converge to the smallest 
value of person-to-person discount rates. The 
smallest value is obtained for the individuals who 
are the worst off in the future generation. There-
fore, in the very long run, only the worst off of 
the future generations matter. More precisely, one 
must focus on the worst off among those who 
benefit from the investment. Those whose share 
is null play no role in the formula.
A complication is that the investment cost is 
generally paid by several members of the present 
generation. If one thinks of a public policy such 
as a mitigation effort to reduce GHG emissions, 
many individuals may be involved. Let us there-
fore consider the problem when several people 
from the present generation contribute in fixed 
shares:  and   But to sim-
plify the presentation, let us come back to a situa-
tion in which only one individual from a future 
generation stands to benefit from the investment. 
The formula is now the following:
The present value can therefore be written as
for 
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This formula has the opposite behavior to the pre-
vious one. When  tends to infinity,  tends to the 
greatest value of the person-to-person discount 
rates. What is remarkable is that the greatest 
value is obtained for the worst off of the present 
generation, among those who share in the cost.
When many individuals share the cost now and 
many individuals share the benefit in the future, 
these two results remain jointly valid, even though 
the formula is more complicated: In the very long 
run, the discount rate converges to the worst-off-to-
worst-off discount rate, among the individuals who 
are affected by the change in consumption to be 
evaluated (for a formal statement and a proof, see 
Fleurbaey and Zuber 2012). This holds whate-
ver the shares, although, of course, the speed of 
convergence is influenced by the shares. 
Table 4 illustrates this phenomenon with four 
individuals, two from each generation. Shares in 
cost and benefit are supposed to be equal (half-
half ) in every generation. In the present genera-
tion the poor has a consumption of 1 unit, the 
rich has a consumption of 5 units. The dynasty of 
the poor has a consumption growing at 1.3% per 
year, the dynasty of the rich enjoys a growth rate 
of 1.5%. We keep .
The table shows that the poor-to-poor discount 
rate is a good indication of the social discount 
rate in this context, even at a moderate horizon 
(but this depends on the shares and is not true 
in general). Observe that the rich-to-poor and 
the poor-to-rich discount rates change with the 
horizon because their relative consumption does 
not evolve according to a constant growth rate. 
In the beginning the poor dynasty remains poo-
rer than the rich of the first generation, which 
justifies a negative rich-to-poor discount rate, 
whereas the rich dynasty is much richer than the 
poor of the first generation, which justifies a high 
poor-to-rich discount rate. In the long run, the 
relative consumptions tend to follow the growth 
rate of each dynasty, which explains the conver-
gence toward a discount rate that is specific to 
the beneficiary rather than specific to the donor. 
(In this particular setting with separate dynasties 
with specific growth rates, the discount rate is 
also a weighted average of the two dynasties’ dis-
count rates, and converges to the lowest discount 
rate, i.e., the discount rate of the dynasty with the 
lowest growth rate, which ultimately becomes the 
poorer dynasty even if it starts richer.)
We now come to the main thesis of this paper. 
Why should climate policies be evaluated with 
a negative discount rate? The person-to-person 
discount rate is negative when the present donor 
is richer than the future beneficiary. Given the 
above result, if we consider long-run policies, the 
discount rate should be negative when the poo-
rest contributors to the policy are richer than the 
poorest beneficiaries. It is plausible that many 
climate policies satisfy this condition. Mitigation 
efforts, when they are well conceived, should put 
the burden on the high emitters who are typically 
among the affluent members of the present gene-
ration, but they will benefit many members of 
future generations. Moreover, it is often said that 
the most vulnerable to climate change are the 
poorest, so that many beneficiaries in the future 
will be among the poorest of their generation. 
Can we hope that the poorest of future genera-
tions will be better off than the middle class of 
the present generation? This appears, sadly, unli-
kely. Therefore climate policies that avoid impo-
sing a burden on the poor members of the present 
generation deserve to be evaluated with a nega-
tive discount rate.
Horizon Discount rate Poor-Poor Rich-Poor Poor-Rich Rich-Rich
50 2,63% 2,62% -3,78% 9,87% 3,02%
100 2,63% 2,62% -0,63% 6,39% 3,02%
200 2,63% 2,62% 0,98% 4,69% 3,02%
500 2,62% 2,62% 1,96% 3,69% 3,02%
1000 2,62% 2,62% 2,29% 3,35% 3,02%
Table 4: The discount rate at different horizons, for society as a whole (column 2) 
and the person-to-person discount rates (columns 3-6)
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Another element reinforces the thesis. Weitz-
man’s result of a convergence toward the lowest 
discount rate in the case of risk combines with the 
result presented in this section. In the very long 
run, the discount rate converges to the worst-off-
to-worst-off discount rate of the worst-case scena-
rio. Therefore, even if there are favorable scena-
rios in which the destitute populations catch up 
and reach good standards of living, it is enough 
to assign a positive probability to dark scenarios 
in which the standards of living of the poorest 
stagnate in order to validate our conclusion about 
the negative discount rate for climate, especially 
mitigation, policies.
Of course, this does not mean that such policies 
should have greater priority than other policies 
such as redistribution toward the poor members 
of the present generation (Schelling 1995). The 
choice of the best policies, as we have seen in the 
second section, involves a comparison of present 
values, not just checking that the chosen policy 
improves on the status quo. At least, however, we 
want to argue strongly against the popular thesis 
that the market rate should be applied indiscri-
minately to the evaluation of all policies, inde-
pendently of the affected populations.
Beyond utilitarianism
So far we have adopted the utilitarian approach, 
which indeed dominates in the debate about 
discounting for the long run. The utilitarian 
approach is quite acceptable in the absence of 
risk, because the utility function can then be cho-
sen, as suggested above, to embody the aversion 
to inequalities in consumption that the evaluator 
endorses. Formally, the utilitarian social welfare 
can then also be adopted by prioritarians and 
egalitarians who accept the property of subgroup 
separability that underlies the additive form of 
the criterion. (Subgroup separability means that 
the evaluation of a change affecting a subgroup of 
the population can ignore the consumption level 
of the unconcerned individuals and focus on the 
affected subgroup only. By an important theorem 
due to Gorman and Debreu, subgroup separabi-
lity implies that the evaluation criterion can be 
represented by an additive function.)
In the presence of risk, things are less easy. The 
coefficient of inequality aversion also becomes a 
coefficient of risk aversion if the utilitarian crite-
rion is then applied as the sum of expected utili-
ties (or equivalently, the expected sum of utilities). 
There is therefore a dilemma. Either one respects 
the risk aversion of the population (assuming 
away a potential heterogeneity of risk preferences 
across individuals), which severely constrains 
the degree of inequality aversion, or one adopts 
a coefficient of inequality aversion on the basis 
of ethical principles and then potentially imposes 
on the population a degree of risk aversion that 
appears paternalist. This is a classical problem in 
social ethics (Harsanyi 1955 viewed it as a key 
justification of utilitarianism), and it has been 
recently mentioned in the context of discounting 
by Kaplow and Weisbach (2011).
Fleurbaey (2010) proposed a compromise. The 
idea is that respecting preferences is much less 
compelling under uncertainty than in a risk-free 
context, because in the context of risk, by defini-
tion, individuals are not perfectly informed about 
the consequences of their decisions. In particular, 
respecting preferences under risk may even appear 
to betray informed preferences when the evalua-
tor has information about the final distribution. 
Suppose for instance that individuals are willing 
to take a risk but that it is known in advance that 
the only consequence of this risk is a widening 
of inequalities, without any overall gain. At the 
individual level the risk may appear attractive, but 
at the social level it is already known that many 
will be unlucky and that they actually act against 
their true interests when they are willing to take 
the risk. When making a decision under risk, 
each individual focuses on his own payoffs and 
ignores the correlation with other individuals. A 
social evaluator can take account of this correla-
tion and forecast how many individuals will turn 
out to have acted against their ultimate interests.
This observation leads to the conclusion that res-
pecting risk preferences is not always necessary, 
but it also suggests that respecting risk prefe-
rences remains an attractive idea when there is 
perfect correlation between individuals, because 
in such a situation an evaluator cannot forecast 
if some of them are acting against their interests. 
Fleurbaey (2010) shows that when the require-
ment to respect risk preferences is limited to the 
case of perfect correlation, other criteria than 
utilitarianism become acceptable, permitting a 
greater degree of inequality aversion. There is a 
theorem stipulating that, under minimal condi-
tions of rationality under uncertainty, all such cri-
teria must take the form of the expected value of 
the equally distributed equivalent (EDE) utility, 
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which is the level of utility that would yield the 
same social welfare if it were equally distributed 
across all individuals.
Let us illustrate this with a particular functio-
nal form. Suppose that  represents the risk 
preferences of the individuals, assuming away 
any heterogeneity across individuals in order to 
keep things simple and in line with the literature 
on discounting.  Suppose that in absence of risk 
one would like to use the prioritarian criterion 
 Then the expected EDE criterion 
takes the form
where  denotes the inverse function and  is 
the number of individuals. 
In Fleurbaey and Zuber (2012), we study how 
this kind of criterion can be used in the compu-
tation of the discount rate. What is important is 
that the discount rate can then be approximated 
by the usual discount rate obtained for the addi-
tive social welfare function , to which 
one has to add a term that depends (positively) 
on the correlation between the well-being of the 
beneficiaries of the investment and social welfare 
at the global level. (There is an additional term 
reflecting the attitude of the criterion to popula-
tion size – this issue will be explained later.)
It is not easy to figure out whether this result 
pushes in the direction of raising or lowering the 
discount rate for climate policies. A first issue is 
whether climate risks generate common risks for 
most populations or induce negative correlations. 
In the case of common risks, the correlation term 
is positive and tends to raise the discount rate. 
The case of negative correlations is possible if a 
change in the climate would actually be benefi-
cial in the high latitudes where the most affluent 
populations are now settled, whereas it would be 
dramatic for the subtropical areas in which the 
most vulnerable populations live.
But even if negative correlations occur, it is still 
possible for the correlation term to be positive. 
Indeed, recall that in the long run, the poor 
members of the future generations are those who 
matter for the discount rate. If the degree of ine-
quality aversion (i.e., the concavity of function ) 
is strong, social welfare as measured by the EDE 
is then close to the lowest utility in society, and 
therefore directly correlated with the well-being 
of the worst-off. 
 Not much is known about the size of the corre-
lation term and simulations are not easy to per-
form because they require considering scenarios 
that describe the situation of the whole human 
species, from beginning to end. An example of 
simulations is provided in the appendix, showing 
that the difference between criteria may be far 
from negligible.
This compels us to mention another issue that 
cannot be ignored when the risk of extinction is 
considered. In the Stern Review there is a 0.1% 
additional term that comes from the estimated 
exogenous 1/1000 risk per annum of extinc-
tion of the species due to cosmic phenomena 
(meteors, eruptions) or unforeseen disruptions of 
life systems (pandemics). The underlying utilita-
rian reasoning is that the expected value of total 
utility is equal to
The computation of the discount rate then 
involves an additional term in the formula of the 
marginal change in social welfare:
implying 
which is approximately equivalent to adding 
0.001 to the initial value (when the latter is close 
to 1).
There is, however, an issue that such an approach 
raises. Different values for the longevity of the 
human species imply different sizes for the total 
human population, which requires taking a stance 
on the question of the optimal size of the popu-
lation. In the utilitarian galaxy, there are three 
popular approaches. Total utilitarianism, impli-
citly adopted above, adds utilities considering 
that a new member with a positive utility always 
improves social welfare. Critical-level utilitaria-
nism adds utilities but deducts a fixed amount 
for every new member. In other words, it com-
putes the sum of , which means that 
adding a new member to society is considered 
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beneficial only if his utility is above . The intro-
duction of the critical level, however, does not 
affect the marginal utility of consumption for 
existing members and therefore does not affect 
the discount rate. The third approach is average 
utilitarianism, which divides total utility by the 
size of the population and considers that adding 
new members is desirable only when their utility 
is above average. The computation of the discount 
rate for this third approach is substantially diffe-
rent and, to the best of our knowledge, has not 
been explored.
With the EDE criterion introduced in this sec-
tion, one has various options for the critical 
level, but unlike utilitarianism there is only one 
constant critical level that can be taken, and this 
is the lowest possible utility. Another salient 
option is to take a critical level that is equal to the 
EDE itself. For a significant degree of inequality 
aversion, the EDE is close to the lowest utility 
in the population, which may not be an unrea-
sonable option for the critical level. Depending 
on which of these two options is retained, the 
discount rate contains an additional term that is 
negatively or positively related to the correlation 
between the well-being of the beneficiaries of the 
investment and the population size (see Fleur-
baey and Zuber’s paper for details).
Conclusion
Let us briefly wrap up the argument of this paper. 
The discount rate only serves to measure the rela-
tive social priority of different individuals belon-
ging to different generations. Therefore there is 
no need to worry about comparing the discount 
rate to the market interest rate, as a rational eva-
luation in terms of present value at the chosen 
discount rate will never fail to avoid dominated 
investments, and never fail to choose those with 
the greatest rate of return.
The key message of this paper is that discount 
rates are really to be computed between indivi-
duals (person-to-person), which gives a great role 
to inequalities within and between generations. 
In the very long run, Weitzman’s observation that 
the worst-case scenario drives the discount rate 
has to be supplemented by the fact the situation 
of the worst off at both ends of the investment 
will also drive the value of the discount rate.
Therefore, if climate policies such as mitigation 
efforts are paid by the affluent populations of the 
present generations and greatly benefit the worst 
off of the distant future generations in the most 
catastrophic scenarios, it is very likely that the 
correct discount rates for the evaluation of such 
policies should be negative, which means that 
a dollar of benefit in the distant future is worth 
more than a dollar of effort today.
In conclusion, we would like to recall that a rigo-
rous evaluation of climate policies is particularly 
challenging because it requires rethinking the 
welfare economics of risk, time, and population. 
In such endeavor the utilitarian criterion, which 
remains prominent in the debates about discoun-
ting, should be questioned and, perhaps, replaced 
with other criteria that better combine a certain 
respect for the risk preferences of the population 
and a substantial degree of aversion to inequality.
Finally, we should recall a point that has been 
made already by Stern (2007). The discount rate 
is useful to evaluate small transfers of consump-
tions across individuals living at different times. 
It is not the all-purpose tool that can serve for 
all evaluations. It is not adapted to large scale 
changes, and it is also not adapted to evaluating 
policies that change the size of the population or 
the probabilities of different scenarios. For such 
policies one has to go back to the underlying 
social welfare criteria. This is an additional reason 
to pay attention to the selection of such criteria 
on sound ethical principles. 
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Appendix
In this appendix, we provide a simple illustration 
of the discount rate obtained by the various uti-
litarian criteria and by the EDE in a simple two-
state scenario. We assume that in the favorable 
state the human species spans 2 million years, 
comprising 80000 generations (a generation is 
25 years), and we assume that 4000 generations 
(100,000 years) have already lived up to now. 
The world population is assumed stable from 
now on, with 3 billion members per generation 
(three generations overlap at any given moment 
in time). The past population since the origins 
is assumed to have grown from an initial num-
ber of two individuals at the growth rate of 0.3% 
per generation until 10,000 years ago, when the 
growth rate rose to 2.62% per generation. 
There are two dynasties, one consuming 1 unit 
today and the other consuming 5 units today. The 
evolution of consumption over time can hardly be 
assumed to be exponential over such a long hori-
zon. Indeed, assuming that the first generation 
consumed 0.04 units (per capita),1 the growth rate 
of per capita consumption up to now would have 
been 0.081% on average per generation, which 
seems very small, but would imply that the last 
generation in 1.9 million years should consume 
about 1026 as much as now, a big number that is 
probably much greater than the number of pla-
nets in the whole universe (the number of stars is 
estimated below 1024). 
We will instead assume that consumption is 
constant, except for the period 1760-2260, in 
which the growth rate per year is approximately 
1.3% and consumption grows by a factor 625. Ine-
quality remains constant between the two dynas-
ties. After the growth transition, future genera-
tions consume 25 times our current consumption 
level. 
In order to introduce risk we also assume that 
with a 20% probability, consumption will sta-
gnate forever from now on, and that only 40,000 
generations live (one million years). This is the 
unfavorable state.
We retain the utility function
and take , with  
and  (This is half the first generation’s 
consumption.) We consider a policy that is paid 
only by the rich dynasty of the 4000th generation 
(i.e., the present generation) and benefits equally 
to every dynasty in future generations, i.e., we 
ask how much $1 equally shared between a rich 
and a poor in the future is worth compared to $1 
paid by a rich today. The horizons in Table 5 are 
expressed in years, and discount rates are also per 
annum, as in the previous tables.
Table 5: Discount rate for the EDE 
criterion, total or critical-level utilita-
rianism, and average utilitarianism
Horizon EDE Total or CLU
Average 
U
50 -3.81% -3.34% -3.77%
100 -1.64% -1.21% -1.62%
200 -0.76% -0.49% -0.75%
500 -0.30% -0.19% -0.30%
1000 -0.15% -0.10% -0.15%
1. If 1 unit is worth $10,000 per annum, 0.04 units is slightly 
above $1 per day.
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The main lesson of this table is that the difference 
between the criteria is far from negligible. The 
difference is smaller between the EDE and ave-
rage utilitarianism than between these two crite-
ria and total utilitarianism, but other simulations 
done by the authors for different consumption 
paths show that other patterns are possible. The 
fact that the discount rates are not very different 
between the utilitarian criteria and the EDE 
(which introduces additional inequality aver-
sion via function ) is a direct consequence of 
adopting a utility function that varies very little 
between the consumptions of one and five units, 
so that the social priority between the two dynas-
ties is mostly determined by marginal utility, as in 
utilitarianism.
The discount rates tend to zero in the table for the 
largest horizons, because the difference in con-
sumption between the donors (5 units) and the 
worst-off in the worst scenario (1 unit) becomes 
very small in terms of annual growth rate. Observe 
that -3% per annum implies a strong priority for 
the future: it means that it worth sacrificing $4.6 
now to transfer $1 fifty years into the future. 
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